The then Prime Minister of Solomon Islands was candid enough to admit that Taiwan was “completely useless to us”, both politically and economically.Īs part of the “switchover” conditions, Kiribati had to sever ties with Taiwan and re-establish diplomatic relations with China. The latest ones to fall prey to the Chinese “buyout” were the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, who were openly assured of “unprecedented development opportunities” in order to grease the deal. Today the number to do so is a mere 15 countries. These Pacific island nations have historically held a pro-Taiwan position and they had made a sizeable part of the 25-odd countries that recognised it till recently. A record seven countries switched sides since 2016. This ongoing Chinese concern and project to get nations to switch sides on the Taiwan issue has accelerated in recent times. However, among the foremost considerations for Chinese diplomacy is also the need to isolate and “compress” Taiwan internationally by “winning over” those nations that still recognise its official status.
Even these nations are creatively leveraging their geographical position to “counter-balance” the predominant and historical Australian tilt and influence in this region to extract the maximum attention and benefit of competitive bidding among regional powers. And third, with increasing reach of the Chinese military-economic might, these nations offer a breakout opportunity from the supposed “encirclement” of China, pitchforking these island nations into the competitive calculus of Chinese hegemonic instincts. Second, the strategic relevance of individual nation “vote” in multilateral fora. In an increasingly interdependent and interconnected global waterway of the 21st century, three factors have driven a sudden interest in this region of less than 2.5 million inhabitants.įirst, the growing domestic aspirations within these nations. The sheer distance, fragmentation and “non-threatening” idyll of these small island nations ensured an isolated tropical paradise that was bereft of any major geo-political or geo-strategic posturing till now. One global theatre that was spared the Chinese radar of urgency was the island region of Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia in the Pacific Ocean. The importance of having such beholden nations can be gauged from the fact that in the high tables of international diplomacy, like the United Nations, each country’s vote counts as “one.” This theoretically makes the vote of a country like Nauru, that has a population of less than 15,000 people, matter as much as that of China with a population of 1.5 billion. Wherever physical distance still challenges the Chinese “supply chain abilities” to maintain a viable military presence, it can dominate the narrative by out-funding other donor nations or organisations and champion these distant lands, such as in the African hinterland or Latin America.īy punting in these distant lands, not only does Beijing sustain captive sources for raw materials and a ready market for its Chinese end-products but also guarantees invaluable political and diplomatic influence. The attempt to stitch together Chinese presence along the crucial sea routes, pursuant to the “String of Pearls” policy, is an ostensibly commercial initiative, one that will subsequently evolve into the invariable presence of Chinese military’s boots on civilian ports such as Djibouti. Often, there is a hybrid model in between that entails the overlapping of the commercial-military footprint through strategic investments by China. Take the example of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC), where a nation-sustaining investment of up to $60 billion has been made to Pakistan, whose economy is cash-starved today. Both as an undisputed military and an economic powerhouse, the options for Beijing vary from flexing its military muscle (as done in the South China Seas) or by ensnaring nations into economic bondage by pouring billions of dollars. The Chinese have either deployed “intimidation” or their famed cheque book diplomacy to “win” over other nations towards their own purposes.
Counter-moves like the Quad need to be strengthened China’s ability to impress upon nations the benefits of joining its bloc is not unknown.
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